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which bear upon the casuistry of our rela­
tions with animals--e.g., "the relative value 
of animal and human life, the relative value 
and weight of anirrL"l.l and human suffering, the 
alleged impossibility of valuing animal su.f­
fering without valuing animal life" (p. 168). 
In his final footnote, he pror:lises to deal 
with these issues in a forthcomi.ng book, 
which is to be a critical assessment of mo­
dern mJral vegetarianism. Rig~ts,. ~.lLLng 
and ~~~ge.r:iQ.~ is that book. 
The focus of the first !x.JOk was to de­
monstrate that ai1irnals--indeed, all creatures 
that lack language--fail to have interests 
which are deserving of moral consideration. 
Interests and Rights, in my view, had naJ"ly 
virtues: it was written in a clear and en­
gaging style and drew attention to important 
f&"ltures of a crucial element of animal Ii­
beration and animal rights-type argwnents, as 
well as of much of contemporary moral theory 
in general, vi~., the concept of interests. 
However, the general critical reaction to the 
!xXJk supports my judgment that it was not 
successful in establishing its main thesis 
(in fact, Frey himself retreats from at least 
one important position of the first brXlk, as 
I discuss below) • [l] The current book is 
fundamentally an attack on arguments for 
vegetarianism that hinge on the ability of 
animals to feel pain--or, as Frey prefers to 
put it, "unpleasant sensations" (p. 175)-­
although arguments based on moral rights and 
on the alleged wrongfulness of killing are 
closely exrunined and found wanting as well. 
The conclusion is that neither considerations 
of eights nor of killing nor even of suffer­
ing provide one with good grounds to become a 
vegetarian. The book shares in lnany of the 
virtues of the earlier one: it is clear, 
lively, and wide-ranging. It also raises a 
nwnber of points that people concerned about 
morality in general, as well as about the 
moral status of animals, would do well to 
consider. Does it do any better with respect 
to its central claim? Finally, I think not. 
But along the way there is a good deal to 
repay a reader's attention. 
Rig~ts, Killing an~ SufferiQ.9.: is written 
in five parts, each generally consisting of a 
series of short chapters. Part I is intro­
ductory matter; it descends from broad re­
flections on the relation of reason and ac­
tion, through strata in which moral reasons 
for acting as a vegetarian are distinguished 
from non-moral reasons for so acting, to a 
discussion of the types of moral vegetarian­
ism. All this is written in a style particu­
larly plain, simple, and pe.rsonal, and pro­
vides, I think, the chief warrant for Frey's 
presenting this book as a "critical introduc­
tion completely accessible to non­
philosophers, students, and the educated 
public" (p. ix). Despite the clarity of the 
prose, some of these constituencies will 
likely find some later sections tough going; 
at the srune time, bearing in mind the scope 
of the intended audience may explain features 
of the text which will strike philosophers as 
odd. I have in mind here his rel::€ated app<eal 
1:0 the "controversial" nature of some of the 
claims made by some proponents of aniJnal 
rights as a basis for rejecting those claims. 
It seew.s a bit odd for a philosofl!'1er--even if 
working in an "applied area"--to be shy of 
controversy; lnaybe Frey's idea is that dis­
cussions that ultimately need to engage the 
public cannot proceed along lines that are 
overly contestible. But !uore of this later. 
Frey surveys a nwnber of possible ra­
tionales for vegetarianism and concludes that 
the fllDst promising, considered from the point 
of view of convincing people to lay aside 
their oITU1ivorous habits are moral. Arguments 
based on aesthetics, religion, waste, or 
"personal style" are just too idiosyncratic; 
the argument that vegetarianism is healthier 
than other diets is difficult to assess and 
not likely to overcome a widespread indiffer­
ence to the relationship between entrenched 
personal habits pnd our health. In any 
event, such points can be met my moderation 
in consumption and by applying pressure on 
the meat industry to reduce toxic levels in 
their products. 
Frey's first part also lets us know that 
moral vegetarianism interests him only to the 
extent that it is based on concern for the 
welfare of animals. One may wonder why. 
Surely, the argument that he focuses most of 
his attention on, the argwnent from suffer­
ing, must be as salient concerning Ethiopians 
as it is respecting veal calves. His answer 
is that it is concern for animal, rather than 
for human, welfare which has reanimated moral 
vegetarianism; it is in the light of the rise 
of intensive fanning ifrlat the whole question 
of what we eat has asswned a new sense of 
moral urgency. Thus, limiting his focus is 
certainly reasonable in principle; there are 
hard issues in plenty just focusing on animal 
welfare. But it should be kept in mind that 
the form of argwnent for moral vegetarianism 
which he ultimately rejects is not the 
71 BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES 
strongest possible form of the argument. For 
ex~nple, in assessing the suffering argument 
he balances off the savings in animal suffer­
ing against the costs in human suffering 
which, given his premises, is fair enough, as 
far as it goes. But he completely fails to 
consider the savings in human suffering which 
could follow from a shift to a less wasteful, 
vegetarian diet. 
While marrying both the animal and the 
human welfare strains of the argument might 
bolster the case for moral vegetarianism, it 
wouldn't fundamentally change the character 
of the position which Frey attacks. He in­
veighs against a "conditional" or "negative" 
vegetarianisrn--i.e., a position which enjoins 
meat-eating not because of the intrinsic 
wrongfulness of consuming flesh but because 
of vegetarianism's effectiveness as a tactic 
against factory farming. 
Factory farming is wrong, it is alleged, 
because (a) such methods of rearing and 
slaughter violate animals' rights or (b) such 
methods involve the killing of animals, which 
is wrong, or (c) animals so reared suffer 
greatly and hence are wrongly treated. Frey 
consistently tries to drive a wedge between 
the alleged wrongs to animals involved in 
failing to respect tileir rights, killing 
them, or causing them pain, on the one hand, 
and consuming them on the other. This is an 
D~portant feature of his overall case, since 
the second feature of his attack--discredit­
ing the grounds upon which intensive farming 
is supposed to be wrong succeeds (on his own 
account) only against the arguments from 
rights and killing. Frey admits that it is 
wrong to cause animals to suffer. But that 
wrongfulness does not mystically transfer to 
eating animals--or even to purchasing dead 
animals for food from those who have caused 
them to suffer in the course of preparing 
them for market. Refraining from eating 
animals is only !!'Orally rnandated if that is 
the most effective way of reducing the all'Ount 
of anirnal suffering. As Frey sees it, it is 
not. 
Clearly, then, one issl;le that Frey's 
book invites us to consider is the relation­
ship between engaging directly in an imll'Oral 
practice and benefitting from and supporting 
that practice. This, indeed, is a crucial 
issue in tenus of his attack on moral vege­
tarianism, since he will allow that factory 
farming is morally objectionable insofar as 
it causes avoidable net suffering. But be­
fore considering this part of Frey's posi­
tion, his criticisms of tile arguments from 
rights and from the wrongfulness of killing 
deserve some attention. 
RIGHTS 
Part III is a sustained critique of 
moral rights. Rights, for Frey, are distrac­
tions empty of tlleoretically defensible con­
tent. Rights appeals lnay have some rhetori­
cal force, but they contribute nothing to 
reasoned resolution of !!'Oral problems. 
Rights impart no gain in clarity, preC1Slon, 
or insight to our handling of !!'Oral issues. 
What's more, if there were anything to be 
gained by talk of rights, an act-utilitarian 
basis could be given for lliem which would be 
much superior to the current non-consequen­
tial approaches characteristically used to 
undergird rights. 
Frey explores three reasons why appeals 
to moral rights are vacuous. The first rea­
son plays on the obscurities of the relation­
ship between the concept of a rroral right and 
the distinction between right and wrong. 
There surely are ways of wronging someone 
that don't, on anyone's account, involve 
violating any of their rights, Frey suggests. 
He may well be right about that, and it 
is an issue that deserves clear scrutiny. 
writers from Aristotle to John Ladd have 
argued that moral notions like justice and 
the oft-associated idea of rights are rele­
vant only in certain contexts. [2] But just 
what contexts those are may be more proble:lla­
tic than Frey realizes, to judge from his own 
example. Husband Heathcliff adamantly refu­
ses to serve wife Cathy fried eggs, despite 
her ardent desire for them, and further, 
despite the fact that making eggs in that 
fashion wouldn't discommode Heathcliff one 
bit. Now, Frey would have his readers agree, 
although Heathcliff may well be doing wrong 
to Cathy, it would surely be silly to under­
stand that as a matter of violating Cathy's 
right to fried eggs for breakfast. 
I don 't know that the matter is quite as 
plain as Frey puts it. One might wonder just 
why Heathcliff is so indifferent to the de­
sires of his wife and suspect that the objec­
tionable character of Heathcliff's action 
comes less from the frustration Cathy may 
actually feel and !!'Ore from a certain atti-
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tude that Heathcliff's action expresses 
toward her. It may tu:m out, after all, to 
be hard D) capture this intuitive sense of 
what's wrong here with accounts that reduce 
everything to consequences, especially if 
those are understood as consequences of which 
CatllY has sanehow to be avlare. For, if 
Heathcliff's recalcitrance here is a way of 
expressing his cont~npt for his partner, tilen 
it se~s plausible to say that he has failed 
to dccord to Cathy the respect dUf~ her--and 
thereby violated a right she has, not to 
fried eggs, but to her spouse's respect i~~d 
concenl. 
Frey could surely respond that all tllis 
is slinply lY2gging the question; it doesn't do 
the first thing toward showing that any of 
C:l.t.':ty's "rights" have been violated. But the 
case was presented for intuitive judgment, 
and it could well produce intuitions which 
would ill fit act-utilitarianism. Some sort 
of non-consequentialist approach mi<Jht turn 
out to supply a well-behaved conception of 
rights which would shed some light on those 
intuitions ~ut Cathy's disappointing break­
fasts. 
Frey's second line of attack is that 
rights are superfluous at best. They are 
justified, if at all, by the valid =ral 
principles which stand behind them, and if 
you allow the principles, the rights have no 
work to do. Sane non-consequentialist wri­
ters slip back and forth between rights-talk 
and principle-talk without seeing much of an 
issue. [3] For them, as for ot~ers, the real 
issue here may not be whether there are 
"rights" or "principles" but whether the 
best-defensible moral theory is consequen­
tialist or not. Frey does not directly argue 
that tile priority problem is a serious one; 
rather, he goes on to claim that the most 
fundamental problem is the arbitrariness of 
non-consequentialist accounts of moral norms. 
Such views leave us to fall back on our own 
viscera in order to discover fundamental 
moral principles (or rights) and to adjudi­
cate the conflicts which arise between them. 
Recent efforts in the literature include 
systems which have but one fundamental 
right--e.g., the right to equal concern or 
respect, as prominently feature in Ronald 
Dworkin's :raking Rights Seriously. All other 
rights are derived, and rights conflicts 
settled with reference to the fundamental 
right. But even with common ground of this 
sort, without an additional battery of auxil­
iary (and possibly contentious) principles, 
it seenB likely that there would be sane 
difficult priority disputes. But tile criti­
cal line that Frey takes here is simply to 
point out that the kinds of rights claims 
tilat people actually dispute ~ut'--e.g., 
disagreem~t about U1e right to keep and bear 
arms--seem Ve:J:.y remote from the allegedly 
fundamental right. 
However, this does not seem a decisive 
criticism. Dworkin, I take it, is carunitted 
to such rights following (if, in fact, they 
do) from the right to equal concern and re­
spect; Frey is dubious. The way to resolve 
this is for Dworkin, or someone of like mind, 
to take his best shot at working out a deri­
vation and then for Frey and his allies to 
dig out flaws in it. 
If, taking anotiler tack, one postulates 
several basic flDral rights, as do tlrinkers 
like H. J. McCloskey and J. L. Mackie, one is 
left with the problem of resolving conflicts 
at a basic level. Such conflicts, as McClos­
key admits, may not be resolvable rationally. 
If part of the point of secular et.'1ics 
is to provide the conditions for public dis­
cussion of moral matters, tllen the intuition­
ism which seems to infect rights-based theo­
ries to one extent or another is a serious 
problem. Sane wo.rkers in this tradition-­
like Tom Regan, whose discussion of the theo­
retical foundation for rights in his The case 
fo~ Anlinal Rights is not mentioned by Frey-­
develop mechanisms designed to produce "qual­
ified" moral intuitions; the intuitions qual­
ify if they pass a number of tests--which 
themselves seem largely intuitive. But it 
seems not unreasonable to believe that such 
"qualifying intuitions" may be rather broadly 
shared. And, in any event, the general tac­
tic of checking theoretical judgments against 
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intuitions seems hard to avoid altogether; 
even given the difficulties of appeal to 
intuition, it seems that a moral theory which 
is totally divorced from cO!lllOCln lTDral beliefs 
would be of no more use in providing the 
grounds for shared rational discourse on 
these matters than those which merely eleva­
ted the idiosyncracies of a particular social 
class to the status of absolute moral princi­
pies. 
Many rights theories--~Eckie's and Re­
gan's among them--dismiss consequentialism 
because of their impression that such views 
outrage basic moral intuitions, and then seek 
out accounts which can capture these intui­
tions. Such accounts seem crucially to in­
volve such non-consequentialist elements as 
"principles" and "rights." The acceptability 
of such views rests on the probity of appeals 
to intuitions, on the assessment of the pre­
valence of anti-consequentialist intuitions, 
and on the correctness of the judgment that 
consequentialism hasn't the resources to 
account for such ostensibly contrary intui­
tions ~ as there are. Frey attacks all these 
claims. 
The strategy here is encanpassing, to 
say the least. Frey appears to be arguing 
that appeals to intuition are irrelevant and 
that there are as many significant pro-conse­
quentialist intuitions as anti-consequential­
ist intuitions. At the same time, he tries 
to portray act-utilitarianism as a moral view 
which has the resources to deal with osten­
sibly anti-consequentialist intuitions. I 
think his attempt here is unsuccessful. 
Rights can be seen as barriers against 
decisions made solely on consequentialist 
grounds, in deference to the supposedly coun­
ter-intuitive character of these decisions. 
But how high a barrier is required? The 
problem of determining the strength of rights 
is seen by Frey as affording an opening to 
the act-utilitarian. A carefully chosen 
scheme of rights may have both a high accept­
ance utility and a (generally) high observ­
ance utility; such a scheme will resist vio­
lation on the basis of merely marginal incre­
ments in utility. Various measures can be 
taken to increase the utility of observing 
the scheme--e.g., legal and informal sanc­
tions for departing fran its provlslons. 
Additionally, we can review our concept of a 
right--or, as Frey puts it, "loosen certain 
preconceptions about rights"--which will make 
the act-utilitarian account more palatable. 
We can note, for instance, that rights are 
not all of a piece, neither in point of their 
moral importance nor in their resistance to 
utility. We can note further that we think 
it sometimes wrong to exercise a right. Ob­
servations of this kind may support an act­
utilitarian theory "amenable to individual 
rights" using a concept of individual rights 
"amenable to (act- )utilitarian theory." 
This approach seems to miss the point. 
Surely, the fundamental feature about anti­
act-utilitarian intuitions is that they are 
expressions of the notion that there is some­
thing about moral situations that utility 
does not capture. Successful secret killings 
of persons are wrong, we think, and not be­
cause v,e can rig things so as to make ·the 
consequences bad. In fact, it isn't clear, 
on the act-utilitarian view, why we ought to 
try to make sanething bad, if it isn't bad 
already. Why not reject the intuition, ra­
ther than cater to it? If people think that 
something is wrong when it isn't or think it 
is worse than it actually is, should we 
strive to reeducate them or strive to change 
the moral reality of the situation? Frey 
would presumably answer this question in 
tenns of the consequences following on either 
course of action. It follows from such a 
view that the proper response to take to 
actions or practices judged wrong on the 
basis of anti-act-utilitarian intuitions will 
itself be a matter of utility, and this re­
sult, I should think, will outrage anti-act­
utilitarian intuitions as much as anything. 
If the morality of secret and painless kill­
ings, say, in any fundamental part is a mat­
ter of whether there are effective techniques 
for brainwashing those of us who feel that it 
is wrong, then no non-utilitariaI) is likely 
to feel that a proper account of the matter 
has been reached. 
As Frey goes on to admit (in Chapter 
10), the system of act-utilitarian rights he 
offers gives us only "shadow" rights. They 
do not "trump" utility; rather, they are 
created on a foundation where the utilities 
of accepting them and observing them as 
guides to action resistant to mere marginal 
increments of utility are carefully factored 
in and buttressed round with extrinsic "Util­
ity-intensifiers." But as we have seen, the 
"extrinsic utility-intensifier" move sets up 
serious conflicts with just the sort of moral 
intuitions that the strategy was originally 
designed to accommodate. While in the ab­
sence of such intensifiers, the position 
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seems more shadowy than ever. 
Frey spends some time exploring R. M. 
Hare's "two-level" acoount of moral thinking, 
which distinguishes a "critical" and an "in­
tuitive" level in our reflections, locates 
rights at the intuitive level, and assigns 
the critical job of determining guides for 
living to act-utilitarianism. All this in 
aid of "drawing the sUng from the charge 
that act-utilitarianism conflicts witl1 ordi­
nary rrorality" (p. 90). But Frey is dubious: 
Hare's account demands that agents make 
"global determinations," since more overall 
utility will be produced by accepting a par­
ticuldr guide, not as a rule of tl1umb, or 
"shadow right," but as a "full blooded" 
right, even in situations where, at least 
locally, utility would be better servE.'Ci by 
our making exceptions. Are we better in a 
position to make global or local determina­
tions of utility? Hare apparently thinks tl1e 
former; Frey inclines to the latter. 
If Frey is right, it seens that he has 
dealt his own position something of a blow. 
After all, his own attempt to locate rights 
within act-utilitarianism is defective, and 
not only on the basis of the argument of this 
review; he himself admits that it yields only 
shadow rights. Hare's attempt is also unsa­
tisfactory. . So, despite his claim to b'1e 
oontrary, Frey provides us with· no reason to 
think that a rights approach is compatible 
with act-utilitarianism. Does this matter? 
After all, we ha.'Je been assured that rights 
oontribute noti1ing to our deliberations about 
morality. 
As I understand it, much of utilitarian­
ism's appeal comes from its promise to afford 
a oontext for shared discourse about norali­
ty. The appeal to non-oonsequentialist con­
siderations--whether they be rights or prin­
ciples--is vitiated by the fact that they 
rely on inbJitions to adjudicate disputes, 
and it is precisely such intuitions tl1at are 
likely to be in dispute. But if oonsequen­
tialistic results outrage widely shared in­
tuitions, it seems unlikely that the added 
efficiency of that approach will compensate 
for its revisionist nature. And, what is 
more, it is not clear that utilitarianism 
will actually be a better basis for public 
moral discourse, in part because of disputes 
about what oonsequences mi']ht actually ensue 
fran what decisions, about how those oonse­
quences would affect utility, and so forth. 
Its place in public disoourse is all the rrore 
dubious, I think., because there is no good 
reason to suppose that resolving lTIOral dis­
putes in terms of explicit calculations of 
utility will actually rnaximize the overall 
uhlity. It may well be the case that the 
utilitarian good is best Pursued indirectly-­
i.e., by encX)uraging !!.oi J.2<?} loi to act ac­
oording to non-oonsequentialist principles, 
while the c~scenti act according to act­
utilitarianism. The very possibility that 
SUd1 "indirect oonsequentialism" may be the 
llIOSt efficient way of pursuing the good 
raises disturbing spectres: it may well be 
tl1e case that Ilorality would mandate blffining 
what is actually rrorally good, praising what 
is morally wrong, or lying about llOral prin­
ciples. If this possibility oould becone 
actual, tl1en the virtue of act-utilitarianism 
--that it undergirds effective and embracing 
llIOral discourse-'-would lapse. 
KILLING 
Many defenders of animals may not be at 
all distressed by Frey's sustained argument 
against rights; with some notable exceptions 
(e.g., Joel Feinberg and Tom Regan) many of 
the rrost influential rights theorists find 
that animals have no place in their systems. 
'utilitarian L~eories characteristically de­
mand much less for moral oonsiderability; 
mere sentience will do. For this reason, 
Frey regards the utilitarian argwnent that 
oontemporary farming practices cause much 
llIOre pain and suffering than they do pleasure 
to be the vegetarian's llIOSt plausible line. 
But before eXffinining "the pain and suf­
fering argument," Frey oonsiders the attempt 
to found llIOral vegetarianism upon an appeal 
to the wrongness of killing. He is skeI;'tical 
about any such attempt on what seems pritnari­
ly rhetorical grounds: it is simply going to 
be hard to oonvince people that they ought to 
become vegetarians on such a basis, given how 
re(~ndite the issues are. Frey regards the 
issue of the morality of killing to be one on 
which we are deeply split along utilitarian/ 
non-utilitarian lines; the oonsiderations 
that either side adduces to explain just why 
killing is wrong strike the other as hardly 
to be credited, especially when someone on 
either side tries to advance an argument for 
extending the prohibition against killing to 
cover anitnals. 
It is, I suppose, quite appropriate for 
applied philosophy to be particularly oon­
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cerned about the persuasive force of a given 
line of arg1.11'nent, as well as about the argu­
ment 's soundness. I don't, however, think 
that the situation is just as he paints it; 
in my view, the account of the wrongness of 
killing put forward by act-utilitarianism 
constitutes one of its major theoretical 
embarrassments. 
Perhaps it is from a sense of the vul­
nerability of act-utilitarianism in this 
respect that Frey is concerned to derronstrate 
the weakness of other positions as well. One 
would think that if Frey chose at this point 
to discuss the work of others, he would se­
lect someone like Regan, or Steve F. Sapont­
zis, whose views about the wrongness of kill­
ing animals are well-known fu,d carefully 
argued. Instead, he chooses to discuss a 
writer of less philosophical sophistication, 
Michael W. Fox, whose position, as Frey 
shows, suffers from a number of confusions. 
Fox is taken as attempting a defense of the 
"reverence for [all] life" position, which 
isn't hard to make look dubious. 
others of Frey's arguments in this con­
nection are directed more carefully, and at 
more substantial targets. Using a distinc­
tion introduced by James Rachels, between 
"being alive" and "having a life," Frey ar­
gues persuasively that the Ilajor fcod animal, 
the chicken, cannot reasonably be said to 
have much of a life; this point is particu­
larly deft in that it brings to mind Torn 
Regan's "subject of a life" notion and the 
associated criterion introduced in his The 
Case for Animal Rights of "one year old mam­
mals" as rroral paradigms. Mother target 
that brings Regan to mind is the "marginal 
cases argument"--i.e., the claim, often ap­
pealed to by Regan in his earlier work, that 
since many animals are on a par with many 
(damaged) humans in all rrorally relevant 
respects, whatever noral status the latter 
enjoy must be accorded as well to the fonner. 
In past work, including Interests and Rights, 
Frey was inclined to think that morally rele­
vant differences could be found in such areas 
as potentiality, the possibility of ensoul­
ment, and in physical resemblance. He now 
(wisely, it seems to me) regaIds all of these 
points as inadequate bases for any morally 
important difference. But although he now 
accepts the marginal cases argument, he 
stands it on its head: it is the moral 
status attributed to damaged humans that 
needs to be revised downwards. Since animals 
are acceptable for use in serious scientific 
research (as shown by the appeal to benefit) 
and since there are no morally relevant dif­
ferences between such animals and sorne humans 
(e.g., profoundly mentally retarded infants) 
such humans are also permissible subjects of 
such research. Utilitarians would generally 
appeal to "side effects" to ward off such a 
result, but Frey isn't impressed-the revul­
sion that Harry would feel at this rncdest 
proposal is a matter, after all, of psycholo­
gical contingencies of which education of the 
proper sort might well rid us. (Recall my 
objections to Frey's own use of contrived 
side effects to bolster "act-utilitarian 
rights.") Perhaps Frey would put more weight 
on side effects if he tried to defend another 
implication of his account here: that rrar­
ginal humans could be produced for the table 
as well as for the laboratory. 
In another place I have discussed Frey's 
"inverted espousal" of the marginal cases 
argument and have argued that his failure to 
examine the erootions surrounding the birth of 
a "marginal human"--in particular, the sense 
of tragedy such an event evokes in us--allows 
him to miss morally relevant, counter-factual 
differences between such humans and animals. 
Frey is himself much affected by these feel­
ings--his conclusion here is one he is uncorn­
fortable with--but he is willing in the end 
to disown them and mark for elimination via 
re-education. As I see it, his erootions are 
responding to a richer set of features than 
those he consciously considers and finds 
wanting as noral disanalogies. [4] 
All this also serves once again to high­
light the discrepancies between act-utilitar­
ianism and cOlllUOn morality. It is perhaps 
worth bearing in mind in considering Frey's 
defense of intensive meat production that it 
is mere contingencies--in principle elirnin­
able--which make it wrong for factory farms 
to be turning out h= meat. 
Frey's "killing" section also contains 
substantial chapters on the doctrine of dou­
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ble effect and on problems in the development 
of a genuine or "deep" ecological ethic. 
Both of these chapters are significant in the 
light of the currently vigorous discussions 
of these topics in the literature, but their 
relationship to the central theme of the 
book--the examination and rebuttal of tlrree 
types of argument for moral vegetarianism--is 
a bit eccentric. 
SUFFERING 
In a transition trom his consideration 
of killing to that of suffering, Frey exa­
mines Peter Singer's views on the "replace­
ability argument." This argument is anotl1er 
of the curious features of act-i1tilit~'irian­
ism's account of the wrongness of killing. 
It points out that since the wrongness of 
killing many animals cannot be explained in 
terms of their own preferences to remain 
alive, nor in terms of side effects, L~en it 
must reside solely in the diminution of the 
sum total of happiness in the world. But in 
the case of hillldreds of millions of food 
animals, the utility lost by their death is 
made up for by their replacements--the next 
huge generation of food animals who will lead 
lives of roughly equal utility. So, in point 
of the loss of utility, killing animals for 
food is not objectionable. It is also im­
port.-:mt to PJint out that we are not in a 
position to substantially increase utility 
simply by ceasing to kill food animals, while 
cont.inuing to allow new generations of equal 
size to enter the world, nor is it likely 
that we could even maintain current levels of 
animal-generated utility if we stopped using 
those animals for food. Were we to do so, it 
seems lmlikely that we could maintain any­
thing like current levels of animal popula­
tion. 
So, the Singer-type vegetarian--him!her­
self an act-utilitarian--needs to maintain 
either that vegetarianism will provide com­
pensatory utilities elsewhere or that L~e 
lives of intensively farmed animals are an 
actual utility drain, so that the replacement 
strategy actually only replaces net misery 
with net misery. 
Singer has made both moves, and Frey 
colmters both. The "greater compensation" 
strategy takes the particular form of noting 
that with non-rneat diets, the earth could 
sustain a larger PJPulation of persons, pre­
sumably richer potential utility generators. 
Frey responds that there is more to the ga~­
eration of utility than mere numbers, that 
these people need to maintain a certain qual­
ity of life for their existence to be of real 
overall benefit, and that there's no reason 
why t~e availability of meat resources 
shouldn't be one of the criteria determining 
em optimal population policy. 
This argument is very weak; one can only 
suppose that it has been influenced by the 
lamentable way vegetables are prepared in 
Frey's British hane. There is no reason why 
the availability of meat resources should be 
among t~e criteria for optimal PJPulatioo--no 
reasons affecting either health or the quali­
ty and variety of available gustatory sensa-· 
tions. If, all other things being equal, a 
hunan population of, say, 2x could produce 
two time:3 the amo\mt of utility as could a 
population of x, minus on!:i whatever utility 
loss accrues solely fran the eating of fruits 
and vegetables rather than meat, it seems 
incredible that this one loss could overbal­
ance all the other positive features supplied 
by the larger population. Perhaps the PJint 
that Frey ought to make here is that the 
argument attempts to rescue moral vegetarian­
ism in a way that does not directly regard 
anirral interest. For, if such arguments are 
to be allowed, the population point as dis­
cussed here is academic; the fact is that 
there are presently irrmense munbers of people 
whose lives might well be enhanced--even 
saved--if we were to alter our wasteful me­
thods of protein production. 
Frey's response to the second point-­
that ralslng and replacing miserable, inten­
sively farmed animals represents a net drain 
on utility--is more interesting, particularly 
in that it sOilllds what will be a major theme 
in his response to moral vegetarianism' s ~st 
eDrnpelling eDnsideration, the argument from 
suffer.ing. He names this theme the "amelior­
ation" argument; in the present context, it 
eDnsists in ~~e claim that meat-eaters could 
respond to Singer's challenge not by becaning 
vegetarians but by working to improve eDnm­
tions on factory farms such that the anil11rJ.ls 
living there might enjoy a positive utility 
balance and, hence, would be replaceable 
without diminishing overall utility. One 
important consideration here is how much 
these conditions would have to be improved; 
Frey suggests that the required improvements 
may be fairly manageable; not all farm ani­
mals, it must be admitted, are treated as 
badly as veal calves or as battery caged 
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hens. Another question concerns the level of 
improvement that would be acceptable; the 
replac~ility argument would seem to support 
the view that morality is satisfied so long 
as animals don't suffer an altogether miser­
able existence. Singer sometimes writes as 
though he espouses what is here called a 
"single (p:tinful) experience view," and in 
other places as t.l-tough he accepts the miser­
able life perspective; other cut-off points 
are, of course, at least imaginable. A third 
question will be one of tactics: how may we 
best obtain whatever level of amelioration we 
determine to be necessary? 
Frey takes a more sanguine view than 
Singer concerning the inmensity of farm ani­
mal suffering and more consistently espouses 
the miserable existence view. But the major 
difference is that Frey advocates a very 
different tactic than does Singer in respond­
ing to animal suffering. His champion is not 
the nural vegetarian but, rather, the "con­
cerned individual. II Concerned individuals 
are nnved by the arguments and descriptions 
in Singer's writings; they wish to end the 
p:tinful raising and killing of animals. But 
they express this conviction not through 
forswearing the consumption of meat. Rather, 
they 
(a) strive to improve conditions on 
factory farms, to eradicate some of 
the devices and practices upon 
them, and to replace them with more 
humane ones, (b) divert resources 
into the developnent of new and 
relatively painless methods of 
breeding, feeding and killing ani­
mals, of new pain-preventing and 
pain-killing drugs, of new types of 
tranquilizers and sedatives, etc., 
and (c) seek further appropriate 
breakthroughs in genetic engineer­
ing. (p. 182) 
The remainder of Frey's book is largely 
an attempt to show that the concerned indivi­
dual's choice of tactic is far sounder than 
that of the moral vegetarian. 
The most fundamental p:trt of Frey's 
argument in favor of the "concerned indivi­
dual tactic" is the complex clai.rn that it is 
by no means evident that the interests sup­
porting factory farming can only be combatted 
effectively through vegetarianism, Singer to 
the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, it 
isn't clear that the call to vegetarianism 
has been or will be at all effective in this 
regard. Further, the reform position advo­
cated by the concerned individual can pro­
gressively reduce animal suffering without 
exacting the cost that vegetarianism entails. 
What cost? As Frey portrays it, com­
plete conversion to vegetarianism would have 
a massive negative imp:tct on the economies of 
entire nations. The collapse of the meat 
industry would have terrible repercussions 
throughout the entire food industry. Great 
numbers of people would be thrown out of 
work, and tax revenues would be seriously 
reduced at just the time when subsidies and 
social programs to offset lost earnings would 
be p:trticularly required. 0ti1er sources of 
livelihood--the clothing, phanoaceutical, 
veterinary, p..lblishing, and advertising in­
dustries--would be depressed as well. 
Frey, I think it must be admitted, has a 
point in principle. If act-utilitarians 
really are going to base moral decisions 
solely on consequences, then they have to 
spend more time than they generally do in 
working out just what the consequences will 
be. Nonetheless, some scepticism about 
Frey's dire predictions is perhaps warranted, 
and, as mentioned earlier, Frey omits to list 
the benefits to humans accruing from a shift 
to vegetarianism. 
Steve F. Sap:Jntzis, in his forthcoming 
11orals, Reason, and ~imals, has noted that, 
grave as they are, Frey's points have the 
character of temporary dislocations; the 
utility deficit they cause would in time be 
made up for by the lack of animal p:tin, a 
source of positive utility which will contin­
ue indefinitely. But I think that this re­
sponse doesn't quite meet Frey's point. On 
his account, the concerned individual's stra­
tegy would secure the benefit of lessened 
animal pain without the expense of mass i ve 
corporate, cultural, or individual disloca­
tions--dislocations that would be likely to 
occur even if the shift were a gradual one. 
This is because the goal of the concerned 
individual includes a thriving meat industry 
in which animals have lives that are worth 
living--ideally, p:tin-free lives. 
This consideration is buttressed by the 
claim that the concerned individual's tactics 
are more likely to work than the vegetari­
an's. Frey notes that despite the rise in 
the number of vegetarians over the p:tst thir­
ty years, the amount of meat produced has 
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skyrocketed. In the face of this, it will 
obviously take a massive nm~ of converts 
to luoral vegetarianism to significantly miti­
gate the suffering of fann animals; the im­
pact of anyone person will be· extremely 
small--perhaps nil--and this will certainly 
reduce the odds that enough people will join 
t..'1e boycott (aw-etreness of this J;Xlint will 
fu..~er damage enthusiasm for vegetarianism, 
and so on). 
Are things different for the concerned 
individual? Surely, there isn't much that 
one person can do in the face of the power of 
the agri-business lobbies--a mass luovement is 
needed to have much of an impact. And, given 
that fact, won't exactly the same .pressures 
work against someone contemplating whether to 
become a concerned individual as those work­
ing against the potential moral vegetarian? 
Frey takes considerable pains to rebut 
the charge that the concerned individual is 
insincere or inconsistent in continuing to 
eat meat, but it seems that the deeper issue 
is why the individual's scheme is likely to 
be any more effective than its competitor. 
Perhaps he bases this idea on the hope that 
the meat industry will see the amelioration 
route as an acceptable C01-npromise between 
continuing the current path of optimizing 
profit by regarding animals simply as "bio­
machines" and the virtual elimination of 
their industry. But why should they feel any 
such threat, if Frey is correct about the 
impotence of the vegetarian strategy? 
The deepest issue, however, must be 
this: ~ shoul~ IlDral ~~~tarianism and ~~ 
tactics of the concerned individual be seen 
- - ------ ----_.- -­
~ mutually exclusiv~ choic~? 
Consider yet a third possibility: the 
CY.:mcerned moral vegetarian. Concerned moral 
vegetarians both refuse to eat meat and at 
the same time engage in other activities 
designed to improve t.'1e lot of animals. It 
seems likely that it is this strategy which 
is of optillal effectiveness, for it would put 
the meat industry in the position of having 
to face both ethical argwnents for ending the 
exploitation of animals and an economic boy­
cott that would force the industry to change 
it,,; behavior. If it is known that the lead­
ers of the luovemeJlt have behind them a group 
of people not only willing to write legisla­
tors and to attend rallies but also to put a 
crimp in the profits of agri-business, they 
are likely to get a muc'1 luore syrnpathetic 
hearing. 
Perhaps Frey could concede that a con­
cerned individual can be a vegetarian if 
he/she wishes; he might simply say that there 
is nothing obligatory about it. But, given 
the political effectiveness of vegetarianism, 
anyone properly sensitive to the very "pain­
ful practices" (p. 195) characteristic of 
intensive farming, but who nevertheless re­
fuses to stop eating meat, has sane explain­
ing to do. Vegetarianism is, for him/her, at 
least a E!:-~ facie obligation. Further, 
given the myriad of lUOrally worthy causes in 
this world, there may well be uany who are 
concerned about the i.mm:>ral aspects of . cur­
rent food production but who are too involved 
working for the women's mova-nent or . opJ;Xlsing 
the arms race, and so fort..h, to spend the 
sort of time and energy required by the con­
ce.med individual strategy. In such a case, 
they can aid the alnelioration of animal suf­
fering by joining the boycott--a strategy 
recommended by the fact that it consumes very 
little extra time or energy--and thus streng­
then the hand of the concerned moral vegetar­
ians who spearhead the movement, carrying the 
fight into legislatures and board rooms. The 
obverse of this strategy--relinquishing vege­
tarianism while retaining one's concern--is 
open to this objection: among the strategies 
the concerned individual will use is the 
economic power of boycott. He/she will thus 
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advocate that others ought to boycott meat 
and wil~ be inconsistent if he/she urges this 
up:>n others yet shirks it him/herself. This 
is not because of sane principle that we must 
have nothing to do with anything of which we 
morally disapprove but for the particular 
reason that he/she must advocate vegetarian­
ism for others and, unless he/she is rele­
vantly different fran his/her audience, he/ 
she must tak.e his/her own advice. 
Frey might p:>int out here that even if 
the concerned maral vegetarian strategy is 
liable to be more effective than either the 
concerned individual or the maral vegetarian 
alone, the target of the campaign is not one 
at which ~1imal liberationists custanarily 
aim. It is not the reform but the elimina­
tion of factory fanning that is called for. 
Of course, the question of how much refonn is 
necessary cannot be said to have been an­
s-wered by Frey's text, and until that is 
clarified, whether the needed reform is can­
patible with any kind of factory fanning is 
unclear. But even if it is, the alteration 
in the lives of fann animals will have to be 
substantial. If, after needed reforms, there 
is still something morally objectionable 
about the rearing, killing, or consumption of 
animals, it will take something other than 
act-utilitarianism to illuminate just what it 
is. 
Notes 
1. See, for example, reviews by Sumner, 
(Philosophical Review 92 (1983», Steinbock, 
(Philosophical Books 22 (1981», Clark (Mind 
91 (1982», and VanDeVeer (canadian Philoso­
phical ~eview (1981». 
2. See Ladd's "Legalism and Medical 
Ethics," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
(March, 1979) • 
3. Regan's The Case for Animal Rights 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1983) is a good example. 
4. In my "Tragedy of Marginal Cases, \I 
presented to the American Philosophical Asso-' 
ciation in March, 1985. 
Strong the arm, strong the bow 
The crystal stream • • • 
And so falls the doe. 
Strong the arm, strong the bow 
The red-yellow leaves 
Mother, I saw you go. 
Strong the arm, strong the bow 
The November frost 
They said you were spared the snow. 
Strong the arm, strong the bow 
The crystal stream • 
You drank there once long ago. 
Now, another autumn 
Another bow • • • 
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